Cascading Intervention Failure, Sentiment Coordination and Political Platitudes

Initial central planning, orchestrated by special interests through politicos, meaning central planning has become the order of the day, begets more central planning in the form of special interests and their politico ilk. How so?

When the initial central planning doesn’t work as intended the failure begets another special interest/politico intervention based on the last set of “plans” that failed. In turn, the new-newest plan fails which begets yet another set of special interest/politico intervention based on the new-newest plan failure and so it goes resulting in cascading intervention failure.

One might know the concept of cascading intervention failure under another title: It will be different this time. Yes, the concept that it’s not the plan that fails, it’s merely the people instituting the plan that failed. Therefore, new people will make the plan succeed. Yet the plan fails again.

Maybe, just maybe: It’s a plan failure and not a people failure? Nay, nay. It will be different this time! -Or- is it really: It will be different this time, like it wasn’t last time, nor will it be next time.

Sound familiar? Sounds like Greensboro in the last thirty years?

How can one spend thirty years, untold millions of dollars, and yet the city decays? How can one spend thirty years, millions of dollars, the city decays yet do the same thing over and over with only occasional opposition?

There certainly are many reasons, however, one reason, in particular, that encompasses most of the other reasons, is purposeful sentiment coordination by those orchestrating the cascading intervention failure. Sentiment coordination? How so?

Sentiment coordination is the attempt to make all believe in a common experience. That all, believing in a common experience, then need to act as an integrated entity in order to enjoy the common experience and achieve the ends of the common experience. Politicos yearn to be the focal point of the common experience and promote the image that individuals should act as an integrated entity so as to support the common experience and its ends. (1)

If one steps back for a moment and ponders the concept of common experience one will find that individuals do not display sentiment coordination as they lack common experience across the entire array of individuals. Jamal, Jose and Sam have differing experiences/differing sentiments. Even when individuals, such as Jamal, Jose and Sam display some level of voluntary coordination of sentiment, such as joining a club, the club generally has many members exhibiting many, many sentiments and the common experience differs widely among club members.

Regarding politicos and their attempt at sentiment coordination, exactly who sets the sentiment that needs coordinated? Is the sentiment cloaked in platitudes?

You guessed it! Politicos attempt to set sentiment coordination as a platitude. Maybe the following sounds familiar: job creation. Hence everyone is lead down the political path of sentiment coordination of “creating jobs” and being that job creation is a platitude, how could anyone be “against job creation”? Therefore, regardless of cascading failure in the realm of job creation, the failure is supposedly not the point as one needs to feel warm and fuzzy, in that, they support the common experience of job creation. Insidious, huh? (2)

One ends this exercise with unabated, constant and continuous cascading intervention failure. The failure is perpetuated as the sentiment coordination of a platitude makes all naysayer(s) politically framed as against the platitude i.e. “against job creation”. Regardless of the path of failure and multi-millions of dollars wasted, the failure and waste are politically-purposely framed as good… as one merely needs to feel the warm and fuzzy common experience of the political platitude.


Notes:

(1) The People’s Romance, Why People Love Government (as Much as They Do), Daniel Klein, The Independent Institute, Summer 2005

http://www.academia.edu/2802162/The_People_s_Romance


　

(2) Unsustainable platitudes, Pittsburgh Tribune, Donald Boudreaux, 08/14/2014

http://triblive.com/opinion/donaldboudreaux/6556379-74/petroleum-sustainability-policies#axzz39n9x2J8b


　

　

Cash-for-Clunkers, Low Oil Prices and Political Credit Assignment

Ever noticed long defunct gas stations with a price sign still displaying the price per gallon for regular around $2.00 (the day they went out of business, years and years ago). Over the years when driving by the defunct stations have you thought: "Was that ever a great price!”

Now when driving by, it comes to mind: "Yes that was a good price but not as good as the price today!"

On a recent trip past a particular defunct station also noted some junk cars sitting on the property. The junk cars and the old "$2.08 sign" might remind one of something. That something is the infamous cash-for-clunkers.

One of the arguments for cash-for-clunkers was gas mileage. That is, trade in that old gas guzzler with a taxpayer subsidy and receive a new fuel efficient vehicle. As the argument went, the new fuel efficient vehicle will save you money at the pump. Hence instead of paying $2,500 per year for fuel you will only pay $1,500 per year. In effect, one phase of the argument for cash-for-clunkers was: one would be lowering their price/cost for oil by buying the new fuel efficient vehicle.

Moreover, as the argument went on, James and Jane Goodfellow would enjoy $1000 additional dollars in their pocket and they would consume such savings and this would help the economy.

Putting aside the basic point that cash-for-clunkers was merely an exercise in accelerating consumption into the present, at an extremely high price to taxpayers, what about the argument point that one would be lowering their price/cost for oil by buying the new fuel efficient vehicle -and- would enjoy $1000 additional dollars in their pocket and they would consume such savings and this would help the economy?

How is it that the argument to lower the price one spends for gasoline (oil) in the cash-for-clunkers proposition (a select few that actually used the cash-for-clunkers program) is "good". On the other hand, a group of talking heads, pundits and advocates depict innovation and spontaneous/emergent order of the market lowering everyone's price for oil as "bad"? In both cases James and Jane Goodfellow lowered their price/cost of oil consumption, albeit for a select few in one example and the many in the other example, yet one avenue to lower price/cost consumption of oil is good while the other avenue is bad. Huh?

To one extent or the other, could it be that good vs. bad in the oil price argument finds its base argument as:

(1) advocacy of collective action where politicos can take credit vs. spontaneous/emergent order were credit is highly dispersed and no one individual can take political credit,

(1a) "good" is only if, credit for good can be politically assigned,

(1b) "bad" is where credit is politically unassigned.